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Abstract
Consider a multi-agent system in a dynamic and
uncertain environment. Each agent’s local de-
cision problem is modeled as a Markov decision
process (MDP) and agents must coordinate on a
joint action in each period, which provides a re-
ward to each agent and causes local state transi-
tions. A social planner knows the model of ev-
ery agent’s MDP and wants to implement the op-
timal joint policy, but agents are self-interested
and have private local state. We provide an
incentive-compatible mechanism for eliciting state
information that achieves the optimal joint plan
in a Markov perfect equilibrium of the induced
stochastic game. In the special case in which local
problems are Markov chains and agents compete
to take a single action in each period, we lever-
age Gittins allocation indices to provide an effi-
cient factored algorithm and distribute computa-
tion of the optimal policy among the agents. Dis-
tributed, optimal coordinated learning in a multi-
agent variant of the multi-armed bandit problem
is obtained as a special case.
1 Introduction
Consider a multi-agent system in a dynamic and un-
certain environment in which there is a situation of
strategic interdependence. Specifically, suppose that
individual agents are self-interested in that each cares
only about maximizing its own payoff, and that agent
behaviors are interdependent in that some actions are
incompatible with others (imagine, e.g., competition
for a shared resource that is required for any agent
to act). In this paper we address the social planning
problem for such settings.
Suppose that a central planner has knowledge of each
agent’s local world model and initial state, and has
been given the authority to make decisions on the
agents’ behalf. To do optimal planning a significant
distributed problem remains, as the current state of
each agent is private to that agent, and the planner
must somehow gain access to the true state informa-
tion to execute a system-optimal plan.
For example, consider the problem of operating a taxi
cab dispatch. Each cab driver is an agent, whose state
can be considered the location of his taxi at any given
point in time. Drivers receive “reward” (payment)
when they have a fare, the magnitude of which is well-
known given the route request made by a client to
the dispatcher. The dispatcher’s task is to do optimal
planning: assign cabs to clients in a way that max-
imizes total profit. However, cab drivers may have
incentive to misreport their location in order to be al-
located more fares. Here, as in a vast array of other
multi-agent problems, a coordination mechanism is re-
quired to disarm individuals’ self-interest in order to
reach socially-optimal outcomes.
In our solution, the planner solicits claims from agents
about their current state each period, proposes and
enforces the optimal joint action based on agent re-
ports, and then collects specific payments in order
to bring truthful reporting (which enables system-
optimal planning) into a Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE) of the induced stochastic game. The MPE
property means that truthful reporting is the optimal
strategy for an agent at any point in time regardless
of past group behavior, given that other agents also
play the equilibrium going forward, and given common
knowledge that the planner has the correct models for
all agents. In equilibrium each agent plays a simple
stationary strategy (truthful reporting), and thus equi-
librium strategies have the Markov property.
In the special case in which local problems are Markov
chains and agents compete to take a single action in
each period, we leverage the Gittins index to provide
an efficient factored algorithm. We obtain optimal
coordinated learning in a multi-agent variant of the
multi-armed bandit problem as a special case.
1.1 Related work
Broadly, this work is situated within the recent liter-
ature on applying mechanism design to dynamic en-
vironments. For example: online mechanism design
(OMD) [Friedman and Parkes, 2003; Parkes and Singh,
2003] considers an MDP setting in which there is a
global state, agents dynamically arrive and depart,
and each agent has private information about its re-
ward function. Truth-revealing in equilibrium can be
achieved by asking an agent to make a single claim
about its reward function upon arrival. In coordi-
nated planning agents are persistent and need to pro-
vide continual information about their private state to
the mechanism; the OMD solution does not apply be-
cause it does not keep providing incentives for an agent
to remain truthful. Another example is online auc-
tions [Lavi and Nisan, 2000; Hajiaghayi et al., 2004],
which provides a stronger form of truthfulness (namely
dominant-strategy equilibrium) than in our work but
at the expense of a far simpler model. We are not
aware of any work (based on Groves mechanisms or
otherwise) on mechanism design in our setting.
Fudenberg & Tirole [2000] provide a good reference for
game-theoretic solution concepts in dynamic games,
including Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). Prior
work in economics appears to be limited to (complete-
information) Nash implementation in dynamic envi-
ronments [Jackson and Palfrey, 2001], and work on
revenue-optimal sequential auctions [Gallien, 2005,
e.g.]. In this work we briefly discuss optimal Bayesian
learning as an application of our methods: the learning
algorithm we propose is achieved in an MPE. Previ-
ously, Brafman and Tennenholtz [2004] defined the re-
lated notion of an efficient learning equilibrium (ELE),
for two agents in a non-Bayesian setting, without sub-
game perfection, and with agents able to observe each
others’ rewards. Learning as a method to solve games
has been considered both in the game theory litera-
ture [Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993, e.g.] and in com-
puter science [Littman, 2001, e.g.]. However, only
Kalai and Lehrer [1993] (for a repeated stage game)
have considered “rational learning” in which equilib-
rium of learning algorithms is required.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a scenario in which a set of agents I =
{1, . . . , n} interacts with the world, where each agent
is motivated only to maximize its own individual re-
ward over time. Each agent has a representation of
the world as it pertains to itself, modeled as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP). That is, each agent i’s world
model consists of: a state space Si, a set of poten-
tial behaviors or actions Ai, a non-deterministic tran-
sition function τi : Si × Ai × Si → [0, 1] that defines
a probability distribution over successor states for ev-
ery possible action taken in every possible state, and
a reward function ri : Si ×Ai →R≥0 that determines
the reward received when a particular action is taken
in a particular state. Each agent’s value for receiving
reward decays exponentially by a factor γ every time-
step into the future, so a reward of x received t steps
in the future is valued at γt x.
In a multi-agent setting actions can be interdependent
and certain joint actions may be infeasible; i.e., an
action taken by one agent may constrain the set of ac-
tions available to another agent. For instance, consider
a single shared resource required for any action, so that
only a single agent can act in any given time-step.
We propose a coordination mechanism, in which a cen-
tral planner selects a joint action, causing a state tran-
sition for some or all of the agents. Until the final sec-
tion on learning, we will assume the center has perfect
knowledge of each MDP. However, the local state of
each agent’s MDP is private. The task of the center
is to implement the optimal (feasible) joint policy pi∗
that maximizes total system-value across agents, i.e.,
π
∗(s) ∈ argmax
pi∈Πf
E
h ∞X
t=t0
X
i∈I
γ
t−t0ri(s
t
i, π(s
t))
˛˛
˛π, st0 = s
i
,
∀s ∈ S, at all times t0 ≥ 0. Here, pi is a joint policy
that at time t maps joint state st to a joint action at,
where st ∈ S : S1×. . .×Sn, a
t ∈ A : A1×. . .×An, and
Πf is the set of all feasible joint policies (i.e., those that
respect constraints on the joint actions). We include
a null action as part of every Ai, to model the fact
that some agent(s) acting in certain ways may preclude
other agents from acting at all. We can also define joint
transition function τ : S ×A× S → [0, 1].
The planner can compute (e.g., through value itera-
tion) the optimal value function V ∗ : S → R≥0, which
is the system value of the optimal joint policy pi∗, and
from which pi∗ can easily be read off. But, in fol-
lowing the policy the planner must be aware of the
present joint state, while the agents, if queried, may
have incentive to misreport this information in order
to maximize their personal reward.
The tools of mechanism design can be used to yield an
implementation that achieves the optimal joint policy
in equilibrium, despite agent self-interest.
A coordination mechanism Γ = <pi, T, µ> specifies a
joint execution policy pi, a transfer policy T that de-
fines payments from the planner to the agents in every
joint state, and a joint message space µ = µ1 × . . . µn
(usually the joint state space S). The mechanism can
enforce action decisions and transfers in each period,
which are made based on the agents’ reports. Trans-
fers, T (s), can be negative, implying “charges” rather
than payments. Each agent makes claims about in-
formation related to its private state in each period
and has a strategy, σi, which maps the history h (the
agent’s actions, local state trajectory, and transfers re-
ceived) and current state sti to a message σi(h, s
t
i) ∈ µi.
The appropriate solution concept for this environment
is the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) [Maskin and
Tirole, 2001]. Here is an informal definition:
Definition 1. (Markov Perfect Equilibrium) A
strategy profile (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) is an MPE if: (a) no agent
can improve its expected utility by deviating in any
state reachable either on or off the equilibrium path,
given the other agents’ strategies and the agent’s belief
about the other agents’ private state and local MDP
models; (b) the agent updates its beliefs according to
Bayes’ rule where possible1; (c) every strategy is con-
ditioned only on the local state of the agent.
The equilibrium is perfect since the immediate message
sent by an agent coupled with its future strategy max-
imizes its expected utility in all states (in and out of
equilibrium play), and Markov because each agent’s
strategy ignores history and simply chooses a mes-
sage based only on the current state. In general, one
also needs Bayesian updating because expectation is
w.r.t. Markov dynamics in an agent’s MDP and an
agent’s beliefs about the local state—and model—of
other agents.2
A system-optimal mechanism implements the optimal
joint policy. In order to make execution of the mech-
anism feasible, certain other properties are desirable.
For instance, in a truthful mechanism agents report
truthful information in equilibrium.3 A mechanism is
termed ex post individual rational (IR) if it is guar-
anteed that no agent will ever be worse off from hav-
ing participated; when this holds only in expectation
the mechanism is ex ante IR. Likewise, if net trans-
fers from the mechanism to the agents are guaran-
teed to be no greater than zero, the mechanism is ex
post budget-balanced; it is ex ante budget-balanced when
this holds in expectation. A mechanism is strongly
budget-balanced when net payments from the planner
to agents are exactly zero.
3 Coordinated Planning: The General
Setting
In this section we describe mechanisms for coordinated
planning in a general MDP environment. The first
1Generally, while on the equilibrium path.
2But we will achieve a strong form of MPE: each agent
will maximize its expected utility whatever the current
state, and whatever the model, of other agents. This will
make the requirement on Bayesian updating irrelevant.
3This is without loss of generality via an appeal to an
appropriate generalization of the revelation principle to
this setting.
mechanism we examine is a sequential version of the
basic Groves mechanism [Groves, 1973], which pays
each agent a quantity equal to the total reward stream
that other agents in the system receive (yielding the
“global reward” for each agent if reports are truthful).
Mechanism 1. (Sequential-Groves)
• The planner computes the optimal joint policy pi∗.
• At every time-step t:
1. Each agent i reports to the planner a claim about
its current state sˆti.
2. The planner implements the joint action
at = pi∗(sˆt).
3. The planner pays each agent i a transfer:
Ti(sˆ
t) =
∑
j∈I\{i}
rj(sˆ
t
j , a
t
j)
Realize that the transfer made by the planner is re-
ceived as “reward” by each agent at the same time as
the intrinsic reward for the joint action is received.
Theorem 1. The Sequential-Groves mechanism is
truthful, system-optimal, and ex post IR in Markov
Perfect Equilibrium when agents have a common dis-
count factor.
Proof. Assume all agents except some agent i follow
a truthful strategy with σ∗i (h, si) = si in all states.
Let νti (s
t,M) denote i’s expected payoff from time
t to infinity, given that the current joint state is st,
given modelsM = (M1, . . . ,Mn) of the MDPs for each
agent, and given that agent i is also truthful. Let pi∗
denote the policy of the planner. At any time t0, for
any state s and for any models M , agent i’s expected
reward when playing its truthful strategy is:
νt0i (s,M) = EM
[ ∞∑
t=t0
{
γt−t0ri(s
t
i, pi
∗(st))+
∑
j∈I\{i}
γt−t0rj(s
t
j , pi
∗(st))
} ∣∣∣pi∗, st0 = s
]
= EM
[ ∞∑
t=t0
∑
j∈I
γt−t0rj(s
t
j , pi
∗(st))
∣∣∣pi∗, st0 = s
]
(1)
For anyM , agent i knows that the planner has the cor-
rect models M and thus that pi∗ is optimal. Moreover,
in any stage of the game, irrespective of whether play
was equilibrium or not until now, in equilibrium going
forward the planner will know the true state because
agents are truthful in equilibrium. By the principle of
one deviation take any state s and consider whether
agent i can do better with a misreport now and truth-
ful reporting in the future. Since the planner’s policy
is actually constructed to solve (1), agent i’s payoff
will be maximized by reporting its true state.
Since the planner implements the optimal policy and
agents are truthful, system-optimality is achieved. Ex
post IR holds trivially, since agent payoffs always con-
sist of some non-negative reward extracted from the
world, plus a non-negative transfer payment Ti.
Desirable properties notwithstanding, this mecha-
nism is clearly unsatisfactory due to its budgetary
properties—in expectation it requires (n−1)·E[V ∗(s0)]
to implement, as the value each agent receives each
time-step is paid to the n− 1 other agents.
Truthfulness is obtained by completely aligning the
goals of every agent in the system, via the transfer pay-
ments Sequential-Groves prescribes. Importantly, this
remains true even when we impose a separate “charge”
on agents to try to eliminate the deficit the payments
cause, as long as each agent’s charge is completely be-
yond its control.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (see,
e.g., [Jackson, 2000]) modifies the basic Groves mech-
anism by charging each agent i a quantity equal to
the value that other agents in the system could have
received if i were not present; we call this the VCG
charge. In VCG each agent’s transfer payment is the
Groves payment minus this charge, and will be equiv-
alent to its marginal contribution to social welfare.
Complications arise in implementing VCG in a se-
quential environment, as care must be taken to en-
sure that nothing an agent reports in one time-step
is used in computing its VCG charge in any suc-
cessive time-steps. However, given that the planner
knows the agent MDPs and the initial joint state
s0, it can compute the expected value V ∗−i(s
0) =
EM
[∑∞
t=0
∑
j∈I\{i} γ
trj(s
t
j , pi
∗(st))
∣∣∣pi∗
]
, that agents
except i would achieve from the optimal joint policy
pi∗, and use this to determine VCG-like charges.4 We
propose the following:
Mechanism 2. (Sequential-VCG) Identical to
the Sequential-Groves mechanism, except at every
time t, transfer payments are computed as follows:
Ti(sˆ
t) =
∑
j∈I\{i}
rj(sˆ
t
j , a
t
j)− (1 − γ)V
∗
−i(s
0)
Theorem 2. The Sequential-VCG mechanism is
truthful, system-optimal, ex ante IR, and ex ante
strong budget-balanced in Markov Perfect Equilibrium
when agents have a common discount factor.
4Note that this is not the value from the optimal joint
policy in the marginal problem without i, but rather the
other agents’ value for the actual policy, so it’s not com-
pletely analogous to the standard VCG charge.
Proof. The argument for truthfulness (and subse-
quently for system-optimality) holds from truthfulness
of Sequential-Groves, plus the fact that each agent’s
VCG charge is independent of anything it reports. In
equilibrium, the expected total payoff to any agent i
at time 0 if it believes that the initial state is s is now
as follows (for MDP models M):
ν
0
i (s,M) =EM
h ∞X
t=0
γ
t
ri(s
t
i, π
∗(sˆt))
˛˛
˛π∗, s0 = s
i
+ (2)
EM
h ∞X
t=0
X
j∈I\{i}
γ
t
rj(sˆ
t
j , π
∗(sˆt))
˛˛
˛π∗, s0 = s
i
−
(3)
∞X
t=0
γ
t(1− γ)V ∗−i(s) (4)
=E
h ∞X
t=0
γ
t
ri(s
t
i, π
∗(sˆt))
˛˛
˛π∗, s0 = s
i
(5)
The Groves payment (3) and the VCG charge (4) can-
cel out in expectation, and so in expectation each agent
receives exactly the reward it extracts from the world
under the system-optimal policy. Likewise, since the
expected payment from the planner to each agent is
zero, in expectation the mechanism is strongly budget-
balanced.
3.1 Stronger IR in episodic worlds
While the Sequential-VCG mechanism succeeds in
many respects, it still achieves only ex ante IR: pay-
offs could end up being negative, depending on what
actual path of execution is realized.
C
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Figure 1: MDPs for a 2-agent world, each with 3 states. If
agent 1 executes action a1 initially, depending on the state-
transition, in all future time-steps he will get reward either
0 or 1. Actions and transition probabilities are italicized.
Consider the example in Figure 1. When the system is
in joint state {B,E}, the expected (intrinsic) reward
each period to agent 1 going forward is: 0.5·0+0.5·1 =
0.5. Agent 2’s expected payoff (including transfers)
each period is 0.4 + 0.5 − 0.5 = 0.4 (its reward, plus
Groves payment, minus a term representing the per-
period equivalent of the expected value to agent 1,
i.e. (1 − γ)[0.5( 11−γ ) + (0.5)0] = 0.5). However, if
the state transition B → C is realized, then agent
2’s total payoff per-period each time-step from time 2
on would be 0.4 + 0 − 0.5 = −0.1, since the realized
reward per period to agent 1 is zero. Note that despite
this potential for violation of (ex post) IR, reporting
truthful state information (including from this state)
still maximizes expected payoff. But since it’s only ex
ante IR, agent 2 would sometimes like to decommit
from the mechanism.
To obtain a stronger IR property, we would like to
be able to use the actual realized joint state at ev-
ery time-step to compute VCG charges. However, any
such charge would not be agent-independent and could
produce incentives for agents to misreport their state.
Though the above example is too simple to demon-
strate this, if circumstances were such that agent 2
could affect which actions were selected in agent 1’s
MDP through its own state reports, it could poten-
tially gain from misreporting in order to lead the sys-
tem to a state where agent 1 has no possibility of re-
ceiving reward and thus decreasing 2’s VCG charge.
Some domains will allow a stronger form of IR. The
Sequential-VCG mechanism will be ex ante IR from
any time at which the agent MDPs are in a joint state,
known to the planner, that is independent of anything
that’s ever been reported. Consider worlds in which a
certain known-state is guaranteed to be visited period-
ically, for instance worlds that start in the same state
every morning. In this case we can provide ex ante IR
periodically, rather than just once—agents will will-
ingly “sign up” for the mechanism repeatedly, regard-
less of the interim execution, every time the known-
state is visited. Similar examples can be provided if
periodic monitoring is possible, so that the joint state
is known for sure from time to time.
4 Coordinated Planning: Markov
Chains
In this paper we are specifically exploring coordination
mechanisms for achieving optimal planning. However,
in the general MDP setting computing an optimal pol-
icy is typically intractable, as the joint state transi-
tion matrices are of size exponential in the number of
agents. Nonetheless, there are instances in which op-
timal planning is possible; we now consider one such
special case.
Suppose that each agent’s world model is a Markov
chain, and at every time-step a single action can be
taken. So each agent knows exactly how to behave
given the state of its world, but the planning problem
remains as only one agent can act per time period.
For example, consider the problem of choosing com-
putational tasks for execution on a server. Say there
is a set of jobs to be processed, each associated with a
known client. Assume the planner has a model of how
execution of any job will go, while the actual execution
realized is non-deterministic. There is one action for
each job in this environment (“process job”), so the
agent MDPs are actually Markov chains. Since jobs
that are not being processed don’t change state, there
will be just a single Markov chain activation and local
state transition per period.
Formally, such environments can be modeled by
specifying that every agent has action space Ai =
{ai, anull}, and at every time-step the planner chooses
a joint action for which all but one component is anull.
For convenience, we write pi(s) = i to indicate that
policy pi chooses to activate i’s Markov chain
Remarkably, Gittins [1974; 1989] showed that in this
environment optimal planning can be done in time
linear in the number of Markov chains. Specifically,
he provided a way of computing an “index” for each
Markov chain (given its current state) independent of
the state of all others, and showed that the policy that
always chooses to activate the Markov chain with the
highest index is optimal.
Theorem 3. [Gittins and Jones, 1974; Gittins,
1989] Given Markov chains M1, . . . ,Mn in states
(s1, . . . , sn) respectively, there exist independent func-
tions G1(M1, s1), . . . , Gn(Mn, sn) such that the opti-
mal policy pi∗(s) = argmaxiGi(Mi, si).
In this environment computation of an optimal policy
neatly decomposes into n independent sub-problems—
each computing the index for one Markov chain—thus
avoiding an exponential blow-up in the complexity
of optimal planning. Several methods for computing
Gittins indices have been proposed, including one by
Katehakis and Veinott [1987] in which a special type of
two-action, k-state MDP is formulated for every state
in a k-state Markov chain, the optimal value of which
corresponds to the Gittins index. Thus all Gittins in-
dices for n distinct k-state Markov chains can be com-
puted by solving n · k two-action, k-state MDPs.
A potential issue in applying Mechanism 2 is in com-
puting V ∗−i(s
0). An index-based algorithm provides
a way to simulate the trajectory of an optimal policy
but does not provide direct value-function information.
Simulation is sufficient for our purposes, though. We
can compute an unbiased estimate of V ∗−i(s
0) by sim-
ulating a policy pi from initial state s0. This will yield
a sample execution path Xpi. We define r(X, t) to be
the system reward yielded at time t in sample path X .
We propose the following coordination mechanism for
finite-state Markov chain environments, in which m
different sample trajectories {X1pi∗ , ..., X
m
pi∗} are main-
tained (for some m ≥ 1).
Mechanism 3. (Sequential-Gittins-VCG)
• The planner computes Gi(Mi, si), ∀ i ∈ I, si ∈ Si
• At every time-step t:
1. Each agent i reports to the planner a claim about
its current state sˆti.
2. The planner activates Markov chain:
i∗ ∈ argmax
i∈I
{Gi(Mi, sˆ
t
i)}
and simulates the next action in each of the m
sample trajectories.
3. The planner pays each agent i a transfer:
Ti(sˆ
t) =
8>><
>>:
−
mX
k=1
r(Xkpi∗ , t)
m
for i∗
r(sˆti∗) −
mX
k=1
r(Xkpi∗ , t)
m
for j ∈ I \ {i∗}
Theorem 4. The Sequential-Gittins-VCG mechanism
is truthful, system-optimal, ex ante IR, and ex ante
strong budget-balanced in Markov Perfect Equilibrium
when agents have a common discount factor. The
mechanism can be implemented in time linear in the
number of agents.
The proof of the theorem follows from that of Theo-
rems 2 and 3 once one considers that the sample es-
timates are unbiased. The mechanism’s formal prop-
erties hold regardless of the number of samples m we
use (as long as m ≥ 1); however, as we choose a higher
m the variance in the estimate will decrease.
4.1 A distributed implementation
We now consider a scenario in which the agents have
computational capacity and can contribute to solv-
ing the planning problem. In Sequential-Gittins-VCG
the computation is centralized (all done by the plan-
ner); we now seek a mechanism in which the planner’s
role is primarily organizational, with the agents them-
selves performing the computation. Gittins’ factored
method leads to an immediate distributed computa-
tional architecture—each agent will be responsible for
computing Gittins index information on its Markov
chain. Now we must bring both this computation and
truthful reporting of state information into MPE.
The agent-independence of the VCG charge presents a
new problem: agent i cannot be involved in the com-
putation to determine its charge. So for each i we con-
sider the reward that would be received under pi−i: the
optimal policy in the marginal world without i. This
can be determined by simply observing the highest
Gittins index among agents other than i, and then sim-
ulating what would have happened if we activated that
chain. Thus to approximate pi−i we need to compute
a distinct set of sample trajectories {X1
pi−i
, ..., Xm
pi−i
}
for each agent i. In total, the planner maintains n ·m
sample trajectories. We propose the following:
Mechanism 4. (Distributed-Gittins-VCG)
• Each agent i computes and reports a claim to the
planner about Gittins indices Gˆi(Mi, si), ∀si ∈ Si
• At every time-step t:
1. Each agent i reports to the planner a claim about
its current state sˆti.
2. The planner activates Markov chain:
i∗ ∈ argmax
i∈I
{Gˆi(Mi, sˆ
t
i)}
and simulates the next action in each of the n·m
sample trajectories.
3. The planner pays each agent i a transfer:
Ti(sˆ
t) =
8>><
>>:
−
mX
k=1
r(Xk
pi−i
∗ , t)
m
for i∗
r(sˆti∗) −
mX
k=1
r(Xkpi−j , t)
m
for j ∈ I \ {i∗}
Theorem 5. The Distributed-Gittins-VCG mecha-
nism is truthful, system-optimal, ex ante IR, and ex
ante weak budget-balanced in Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium when agents have a common discount factor.
Proof. The proof of truthfulness in MPE (and sub-
sequently system-optimality) is essentially analogous
to that of Theorem 2. Each agent’s report now con-
sists of computed Gittins indices in addition to current
state information. Since the report of Gittins indices
by agent i has no effect on its VCG charge (due to the
distinct sample trajectories per agent), the interests
of each agent are completely aligned with that of the
entire system. If agents other than i report truthfully
then agent i maximizes its expected value by report-
ing correct Gittins indices and its true state in every
period. The mechanism remains ex ante IR. The total
expected VCG charge over time for an agent i, given
initial state s, for any Markov chain models M is:
EM
h ∞X
t=0
X
j∈I\{i}
γ
t
rj(s
t
j , π
∗
−i(s
t
j))
˛˛
˛π∗−i, s0 = s
i
(6)
≤ EM
h ∞X
t=0
X
j∈I\{i}
γ
t
rj(s
t
j , π
∗(stj))
˛˛
˛π∗, s0 = s
i
+ (7)
EM
h ∞X
t=0
γ
t
ri(s
t
i, π
∗(sti))
˛˛
˛π∗, s0 = s
i
(8)
The sum of (7) and (8) is agent i’s expected payoff un-
der the policy the planner implements. The inequality
holds by virtue of the fact that pi∗ is an optimal policy.
The Groves payments (7) made to each agent i will in
expectation be less than or equal the VCG charges ex-
tracted from that agent (6), since the latter is derived
from a policy that is optimal for the system without i.
Since this holds for every agent, the expected net sum
of payments from the planner to the agents is non-
positive, yielding ex ante weak budget-balance.
Each agent can compute its Gittins indices in parallel,
and the only added time burden on the planner as the
number of agents grows is in comparing the indices to
determine the maximal index in each period and in
simulating trajectories for the VCG charge. Including
agents in the computation of Gittins indices precludes
the strong budget-balance of the previous mechanisms;
thus we see an inherent tradeoff between distributing
computation and certain economic properties.
4.2 Optimal Coordinated Learning in
Multi-Armed Bandit Problems
One of the most compelling aspects of Gittins’ result is
that it can be used for (computationally) efficient and
optimal Bayesian learning in the multi-armed bandit
problem (MABP). Here is the standard multi-armed
bandit story: a single agent is faced with n arms to
pull, each with an uncertain (stationary) reward dis-
tribution. The agent has prior information and seeks
to maximize its (subjective) expected discounted re-
ward. Each arm can be modeled as a Markov chain:
the states are now information states and not physical
states, the initial state is defined by prior information,
the action is to pull an arm, and the state transition is
defined by Bayes’ rule. An optimal policy for a MABP
performs optimal (Bayesian) exploration vs. exploita-
tion and maximizes the expected discounted reward.
We provide a multi-agent variation of the MABP:
there is a distinct agent that receives reward for each
arm, and there is a planner. Each agent has a (pri-
vately held) prior on the reward its arm yields and
receives private observations of the reward it receives.
Each agent is self-interested and would prefer that its
arm is always pulled. The planner, on the other hand,
is interested in optimal joint learning. This is an in-
stance of coordinated planning with Markov chains
and private state, the solution to which brings opti-
mal joint learning into a game-theoretic equilibrium.
Figure 2 shows the Markov chain representation of a
Bernoulli process that has yielded reward 0 twice and
1 once in three activations so far, displaying two sub-
sequent time-steps. State transition τi(si, s
′
i) for agent
i represents the probability of transitioning from infor-
mation state si to s
′
i when i’s arm is chosen, given the
current belief about the arm as represented in state si.
In an infinite horizon environment, the Markov chain
for each arm will technically be infinite in size. How-
01000
0100
01001
010
01010
0101
01011
0.67, 0
0.75, 0
0.25, 1
0.33, 1
0.5, 0
0.5, 1
Figure 2: Markov chain representation of two activation
steps of a Bernoulli bandit, with 3 previous observations
(010). Transition probabilities are in italics.
ever, since reward t steps in the future is discounted by
γt, we can effectively ignore states far enough removed
when computing each index.5 Nonetheless, since the
Gittins index for any state could still potentially be
required, the infinite state space precludes any mech-
anism that elicits all Gittins indices in the initial step.
Instead, we elicit index reports from agents online,
for both the actual execution path and the simulated
marginal world trajectories. In addition, we no longer
assume the initial models are common knowledge and
instead elicit them from the agents in the first step.
For this we need a concise language, such as a repre-
sentation of priors as sample observations (e.g., 01011).
Mechanism 5. (Learning-Gittins-VCG)
• Each agent reports its prior beliefs to the planner.
• At every time-step t:
1. Each agent i communicates to the planner a
claim about its current state sˆti and correspond-
ing Gittins index Gˆi(Mi, sˆ
t
i).
2. The planner activates Markov chain:
i∗ ∈ argmax
i∈I
{Gˆi(Mi, sˆ
t
i)}
3. For each agent i, the planner updates sample
execution paths {X1
pi−i
, ..., Xm
pi−i
}, asking agents
in I \ {i} to report Gittins indices for states on
the frontier of any sample path.
4. The planner pays each agent i a transfer:
Ti(sˆ
t) =
8>><
>>:
−
mX
k=1
r(Xk
pi−i
∗ , t)
m
for i∗
r(sˆti∗) −
mX
k=1
r(Xk
pi−j
, t)
m
for j ∈ I \ {i∗}
5This can be formalized by bounding the reward in any
state with some Rmax and modeling agents as ǫ-indifferent
so that they will play an ǫ-MPE.
Theorem 6. The Learning-Gittins-VCG mechanism
implements optimal Bayesian learning in the multi-
agent MABP in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium when
agents have a common discount factor. The planner
needs space O(n) and runs in time O(n2) per iteration.
Proof Sketch. Optimal Bayesian learning is achieved
by implementing the optimal joint policy (recall that
states are now information states). Recognizing this,
the proof is then largely analogous to that of The-
orem 5. Each agent will choose to report its cor-
rect model (via its prior) and report truthful state in-
formation and correct Gittins indices. (Actually, it
will be weakly indifferent about these reports since
the planner’s decisions about policy only use its in-
dex reports—see below.) Moreover, agent i will report
correct Gittins indices in each marginal world trajec-
tory (for pi−j , j 6= i) since these reports do not affect
its reward. Fixing m, the planner needs O(n) space to
track the actual and simulated trajectories and O(n)
time to make the optimal decision on each trajectory
in each period (i.e., finding the maximal index).
Learning-Gittins-VCG is also ex ante IR and ex
ante weak budget-balanced for the same reasons as
Distributed-Gittins-VCG.6 The online computation in
this mechanism leads to cases of weak indifference in
agent reporting of models, state, and Gittins indices.
Thus, some remarks regarding the robustness of the
proposed learning mechanism are in order: (a) For re-
porting the model, if an agent j 6= i reports an incor-
rect model but reports Gittins indices for the same (in-
correct) model then MPE is retained; (b) For reporting
the current state, the planner could threaten random
checks of consistency between state and Gittins index
(with a fine), which is sufficient to remove this weak in-
difference; (c) For reporting the Gittins indices on the
sample trajectory paths the effect of deviation would
retain ex ante IR but jeopardize budget-balance (since
the marginal policy would be suboptimal and thus the
VCG charge less in expectation).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provided coordination mechanisms
for a setting in which self-interested agents have MDP
models of their worlds (known to the planner) and
private state information, where the goal is optimal
joint planning. The assumption that MDP models are
6Realize though that the “strength” of the IR provi-
sion depends on the accuracy of initial priors: when initial
knowledge about each action is limited the approximation
of the VCG charge we execute could be little better than a
random guess at the true VCG charge we’d compute if we
could use all information reported by the agents through-
out execution of the mechanism. We think about this as
very ex ante IR, although formally it remains ex ante IR!
known is actually not essential as shown in the final
application to optimal multi-agent learning. Comput-
ing the optimal policy in the general setting remains
an issue. In the context of Markov chains we leveraged
the Gittins index to achieve computational efficiency
and to distribute the computation among the agents;
exploring mechanisms that employ distributed policy
computation in other settings could be a fruitful line
of future work.
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